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Abstract 
Several research simulations have been created to support development and 
refinement of teamed autonomous agents using decentralized cooperative control 
algorithms. Simulation is the necessary tool to evaluate the performance of decentralized 
cooperative control algorithms, however these simulations lack a method to validate their 
output. This research presents a method to validate the performance of a decentralized 
cooperative control simulation environment for an autonomous Wide Area Search 
Munition (WASM). Rigorous analytical methods for six wide area search and 
engagement scenarios involving Uniform, Normal, and Poisson distributions of N real 
targets and M false target objects are formulated to generate expected numbers of target 
attacks and kills for a searching WASM. The mean value based on the number of target 
attack and kills from Monte Carlo simulations representative of the individual scenarios 
are compared to the analytically derived expected values. Emphasis is placed on Wide 
Area Search Munitions (WASMs) operating in a multiple target environment where a 
percentage of the total targets are either false targets or may be misconstrued as false by 
varying the capability of the WASM’s Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) capability. 
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INVESTIGATION OF COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS WIDE 
AREA SEARCH MUNITIONS 
 
I. Introduction 
1.1 General 
Unmanned Air Vehicles are quickly becoming an indispensable force multiplier 
for commanders to conquer complex battlefield scenarios. As the use of these vehicles 
increases, however, battlefield users envision more complex tasks for these vehicles to 
perform. This includes vehicles that work cooperatively together, with little or no human 
intervention, to perform complex tasks such as Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
(SEAD), Persistent Area Denial (PAD), or Urban Battlefield Surveillance (UBS). 
Furthermore, autonomous aircraft capable of performing these types of missions reduce 
the total number of combat forces a battlefield commander must commit to the theater of 
operations. These requirements are driving the ongoing efforts to develop autonomous 
Wide Area Search Munitions  (WASMs) capable of cooperative task execution. 
Several simulations have been created to support developmental research on 
teamed autonomous agents using decentralized cooperative control algorithms. 
Simulation is a necessary tool to evaluate the performance of decentralized cooperative 
control algorithms; however, these simulations lack a method to validate their 
predictions.  
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The work presented here is concerned with the development of a method to 
validate the performance of a decentralized cooperative control simulation for 
autonomous wide area search munitions. A rigorous analytical treatment of six persistent 
area denial scenarios involving M targets and N munitions are used to validate the results 
of identical simulation runs. Emphasis is placed on WASMs operating in a multiple target 
environment where a percentage of the total targets are either decoys or targets that may 
be misconstrued as false targets by the WASM’s Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) 
software. 
1.2 Background 
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) is investigating opportunities to 
expand the future battlefield capabilities through the use of cooperative WASMs. Current 
emphasis is placed on exploiting a WASMs’ ability to search, detect, identify, and attack 
a host of targets autonomously. Work by the RAND Corporation [1] has researched the 
effectiveness of possible WASM configurations along with methods of battlefield 
employment for SEAD and PAD like missions. This study focused on assessing the 
benefit of cooperative behavior of WASM like vehicles.  
The conclusions made by the RAND study indicate a low complexity and thus 
potentially inexpensive munition could perform as an effective autonomous munition for 
PAD and SEAD type scenarios. These vehicles have capabilities such as INS aided GPS 
navigation systems, target acquisition sensors capable of Autonomous Target 
Recognition (ATR), and communications systems capable of sending and receiving 
current battlespace information. An example of this class munition is the USAF 
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LOCAAS [2], as seen in Figure 1-1.  This munition embodies the capabilities, size, and 
level of complexity recommended by [1]. 
 
Figure 1-1 USAF LOCAAS Design Concept 
The concept of wide area search munitions is also currently under consideration 
by DARPA and the US Army under the NetFires [21] program. NetFires is a technology 
demonstration program focused on beyond line-of-sight fires for the Army's Future 
Combat System incorporating LAM, a LOCAAS like munition. The LAM is an 
expendable loitering, hunter-killer, that is seven inches in diameter and weighs about 100 
pounds. It is capable of searching a large area using a laser radar (LADAR) seeker with 
automatic target recognition. It will have a 45-minute cruise capability using a micro 
turbojet engine and a multi mode warhead. 
Current research has focused on how to expand the capabilities of autonomous 
WASMs by incorporating team behavior through cooperative decision-making and task 
allocation. Emphasis has been placed on evaluating these concepts in the context of 
cooperative search, classification, and attack in order to discern improved munition 
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battlefield effectiveness. The following overview briefly covers the findings of current 
efforts in these areas. 
In the area of cooperative attack, Gillen [3] investigated how cooperative 
behavior based on governing rules would benefit a group of munitions searching an area. 
He formulated decision rules based on weighted parameters representative of an 
individual munitions perceived environment.  In this effort each munition relied on pre-
optimized decision rule parameters, with each munition executing decisions based on 
prior knowledge of other munition results, but without further negotiations by the team. 
While this approach did not focus on cooperatively determined decisions, Gillen 
demonstrated that a group following similar decision rules would operate cohesively and 
effectively by each munition making actions that benefit the group as a whole. 
Dunkel [13] and Gozaydin [15] expand on this work by incorporating cooperative 
classification of a target in conjunction with cooperative target attack. Additionally, 
Dunkel and Gozaydin have improved the decision process to control the actions of the 
group rather than the individual. Furthermore, the decision methodology was based upon 
a mathematically rigorous approach, [9], which eliminated the need for pre–optimized 
decision rules tuned for specific scenarios. Using this formulation, Dunkel and Gozaydin 
demonstrated that while cooperative attack alone does not always improve mission 
effectiveness, cooperative classification used in conjunction with cooperative attack does 
improve overall group efficiency. This is because multiple munitions cooperatively 
teamed to provide target identification have been shown to provide higher levels of target 
declaration accuracy. This equates to more munitions attacking true targets rather than 
false or non targets.  
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The effect of cooperatively searching teams has been explored by Flint[20]. This 
work focused on generating near optimal trajectories to follow in order for several 
UAV’s to cooperatively search for targets in a given area for which some a priori 
knowledge about a target distribution is available. A dynamic programming based search 
algorithm was employed to facilitate multiple vehicle cooperation through consideration 
of other vehicles as stochastic elements. This method was shown to generate efficient 
search paths and thus perform the target finding role substantially better than non-
cooperative vehicle formations. 
Park [11] has identified the process a WASM will perform for non-cooperative 
behavior. The following reflects these steps for a generic ground attack role:  
1. Begin searching: Activate ATR/sensors and search for targets.  
2. Encounter/Engage Target: Munition locates target, communicates target 
information, and attacks target. 
Dunkel and Park note that other weapons that are in communication range and meet 
certain proximity requirements will also converge on the target and commit attacks. 
Finally, munitions that are out of range will continue to search for another target. The 
non-cooperative process, as seen above, does not rely on external information for target 
information, nor does it rely on additional munitions to perform an attack on any 
encountered target. This process is similar to swarm or flock systems [7], [8], and related 
to classical optimal search methods [10].  
Cooperatively controlled munitions, however, leverage the assistance of a team 
when performing a search/attack process. The following cooperative team process [11] is 
intended to contrast the differences to the non-cooperative case. 
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1. Begin searching: Activate ATR/sensors and search for targets 
2. Target Encounter: A searching resource locates a target and passes the 
location and type of target to the command and control center. 
3. Cooperative Decision Process: The command and control center processes 
this information and assigns a resource to engage and destroy the target 
4. Encounter/Engage Target: An assigned resource engages the target with 
location and characteristics passed via the command and control center. 
A cooperative search/attack process leverages the capabilities of the team as a whole 
when performing the ground attack role. The main difference between the cooperative 
and non-cooperative case is in the cooperative decision step, seen in item 3 above. This 
allows for an optimal solution to the target attack problem by using the team resources in 
the most efficient way.  
Cooperative control relies on three main elements for success;  
1. Communication 
2. Decision Control/Task Allocation 
3. Management of Uncertainty 
Current research [3],[9],[14],[16],[13] has explored the affects these three items can have 
on cooperative control. Item 3 is of special interest for successfully employing 
cooperative teams to perform tasks. This is due to the fact that cooperative team tasking 
relies heavily on information perceived by one munition and then disseminated to the 
group for processing and future actions.  
Target location and target identification via ATR is the source of greatest 
information uncertainty for cooperatively teamed WASMs. ATR algorithms can and do 
1-6 
 
misidentify real targets as false, and vice versa. Thus, a searching WASM can misidentify 
a target or non-target object and then pass this information to its teammates. This 
scenario will occur in battle, as enemy forces will deploy decoys intermingled with real 
vehicles specifically to increase the searching WASMs information uncertainty. Even 
without the presence of deliberate decoys, ATR algorithms will generally exhibit a non-
zero false target declaration rate. Recent research [3], [13], [15] has verified that the false 
target attack rate has the greatest effect in the mission effectiveness for both cooperative 
and non-cooperative wide-area search munitions. Cooperative classification by multiple 
vehicles can reduce but not eliminate false target misidentification; however, this also 
will reduce the total number of targets encountered by the searching WASMs due to 
multiple vehicles having to return to a single target to verify its identity. A greater 
percentage of missed targets will also occur as a result of requiring confirmation before 
attack. 
Several research simulations have been developed for evaluating the effectiveness 
of cooperative and non-cooperative teams of autonomous search and attack munitions. 
Simulations, such as the AFRL MultiUAV [19] allow for the user to vary the capabilities 
and complexity of the munitions along with varying the type, number, and distribution of 
real and false targets in the battlespace. Simulation tools can be used to investigate and 
validate the effectiveness of teamed munitions in varying conditions. These simulations, 
however, must be compared to an analytic benchmark to validate their statistical results. 
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1.3 Objectives 
The objective of this research is to establish an analytic validation methodology 
for the MultiUAV simulation. This effort will focus on characterizing the probabilities 
for real and false target attacks and kills made by a single searching munition. More 
specific objectives are: 
1. Develop analytic scenarios to model varying battlespace conditions and 
munition capabilities. 
2. Investigate the validity of the MultiUAV simulation via direct comparison 
of empirical vs. analytic results. 
3. Identify simulation deficiencies (if any) resulting from the validity 
investigation. 
1.4 Approach and Scope 
This work presents a method to validate the MultiUAV simulation environment 
via comparison of simulation results to six analytically derived solutions for Wide Area 
Search scenarios. The validation methodology was performed by comparing 5 test 
parameters in the analytic and simulation formulations. These test parameters are; the 
average number vs. probability of successful target attack, average number vs. probability 
of false target attack, average number vs. probability of successful target kill, average 
number vs. probability of false target kill, average time vs. expected time spent searching 
the battlespace before engaging either a target or false target. The values of the five 
parameters were evaluated analytically by way of closed form solution, and in simulation 
via Monte Carlo analysis.  
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Six identical analytical and simulation test scenarios were created to provide 
unique test cases involving realistic target distributions. Each test case varies the real and 
decoy target locations by way of either Uniform, Normal, or Poisson distributions. The 
individual distribution types approximate physically realizable situations, such as targets 
clustered around a certain location, as in the case of a Normal distribution. Additionally, 
a single WASM is considered as the searching agent in the six scenarios. Stochastic 
uncertainty in the performance of the ATR algorithm is considered, thus allowing for 
misidentification of encountered targets. Finally, in all cases both targets and false targets 
are modeled as stationary. 
1.5 Relevance 
This research is intended to investigate the validity of target engagement 
performance for a generic cooperative control simulation. It is not intended to evaluate 
specific cooperative control algorithms, but rather to evaluate the validity of the 
simulation environment in which the cooperative control algorithms are used. 
Furthermore, this evaluation is not focused on modeling a specific searching munition, 
target, or specific geographical battlefield. Search munitions modeled in this research are 
not representative of a specific vehicle, nor are the targets.   
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II. Modeling Persistent Area Denial Scenarios for Wide 
Area Search Munitions 
2.1 Operational Concepts for Persistent Area Denial Munitions 
The success of attacking ground targets can vary depending on both the 
capabilities of the attacking vehicle, the characteristics of the targets, and how the target 
and non-target objects are distributed throughout the search area. One method of 
quantifying the success of such an attack is to construct a simulation resembling such an 
environment. Simulations, however, can introduce variances into the results via actions 
not accounted for in the intended environment setup. Direct comparison to closed form 
analytic solutions can provide an independent validation method for the simulation 
results 
This section covers the development of six distinct analytic closed form 
probabilistic models for a Wide Area Search Munitions (WASM) performing search, 
classify, and attack role. 
2.1.1 Analytical Theory for Search, Classification, and Attack 
Simulation tools such as MultiUAV provide the means for demonstrating success 
in decentralized cooperative control development. However, before any controller 
development can take place, an independent baseline performance comparison is 
necessary to ensure the proper operation of the simulation environment. Pachter and 
Jacques [12] provide a method of system analysis based on applied probability theory for 
vehicles performing search, classification, and attack on encountered targets within a 
search area. For the multi-target, multi-false target case a progression of analytical 
2-1 
 
expressions for six search, classify, and attack scenarios is presented that consider both 
real and false target distributions in the defined battle space. This work represents the 
foundation for the baseline comparison used for the MultiUAV simulation validation. 
The baseline comparison outlined in this work focuses on a single WASM armed with a 
single munition. The scenarios vary the amount of real and false targets, and in addition 
vary the type of target distribution (Uniform, Gaussian, or Poisson field). Uniform 
distributions provide for a known quantity of true or false targets in a given area. 
Gaussian distributions are used to distribute a known number of targets, with their 
locations set via a mean, µloc, and standard deviation, σloc. Thus, a random target location 
assigned from such a Gaussian distribution may not always place the target within the 
battle space. Poisson distributions will be further explained below. 
2.1.2 Poisson Field of Targets 
Poisson fields, by their definition, do not provide a constant quantity of expected 
targets over a specified battle space, As. Instead, they provide an average rate of target 
encounters while searching over As. The Poisson field of targets or false targets [12] is 
characterized by the target probability density, 



2
1
km
α . As an area A is searched, the 
Poisson probability law parameter is specified as 
 ( )λFTRP−1  (1) 
where λ is defined as the expected number of targets in As. The Poisson probability 
function  is defined by )(⋅P
 { }
!
))1(()( )1(
k
PekP
k
FTRPFTR −= −−
λλ  (2) 
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Equation (2) specifies the probability of encountering k total targets based on the 
parameter λ. The Poisson field provides a scenario of uniform targets/false target density 
where it is not guaranteed that any number of any target (or false target) encounters will 
occur in any given area. 
2.1.3 Scenario Comparison Parameters  
The baseline comparisons for all six scenarios will focus on five parameters :   
• Probability of real target attacks,  
TA
P
• Probability of false target attacks,  
FTA
P
• Probability of successful target kills, PTk 
• Probability of successful false target kills, PFTk 
• Longevity of WASM given attack occurs, 
sT
s , where s is time of attack 
These probabilities allow for the formulation of expected attacks and kills of both real 
and false targets. As a note, Ts is defined as the total time available to search the battle 
space. 
2.1.4 Search Area Definition 
Scenarios 1-6 assume the WASM searches over a linearly defined area, as 
represented in Figure 2-1 Linear Search Path. 
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Figure 2-1 Linear Search Path 
 Here, the WASM has the parameters of forward velocity V, and sensor swath width W to 
define search rate and the total search area, AS. Section 2.3 will cover the details of 
scenarios 1-6, however the methodology used to determine the probability for target 
report must first be explained.  
2.2 Probability of Target Report 
WASMs rely on Automatic Target Recognition systems to perform target 
identification and classification. This process is not 100% accurate, and thus introduces 
error into the vehicle’s decision algorithms. In order to more accurately represent the 
error in Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) a confusion matrix is used to represent the 
probability of both correct and incorrect target reports. When a WASM encounters a 
target, error associated with ATR has the possibility of causing false target detections or 
missed target declarations. The confusion matrix models the ATR function based on 
probability of target report, , and probability of false target attack given false target TRP
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encounter, EFTAP . An example of a binary confusion matrix for the single target type case 
is shown in Figure 2-2 Binary Confusion Matrix. 
 Encountered Object 
 Target Non-Target 
Declared Object     
Target PTR 1- PFTR 
Non-Target 1-PTR PFTR 
Figure 2-2 Binary Confusion Matrix 
The confusion matrix provides a simple method to determine the probability of 
falsely declared target. This is represented by the probabilities of target and false target 
detection in the rows of the matrix. Because an encountered object will be declared either 
a target or non-target, the columns of the matrix sum to one. 
2.2.1 Confusion Matrix Implications in Poisson Modeling of Targets  
The confusion matrix represents the potential for misinformation from the ATR 
function, which in turn will cause a vehicle to misinterpret a real target as false, or vice 
versa. If the munition is destroyed after attacking a target, such as a missile, then the 
probability of engaging a target in ∆A is conditioned on not having engaged a false target 
prior to arriving at it’s current position. For the single target scenario, the probability of 
encountering a target within ∆A is defined as 
 
s
FTAE A
AAPP ∆=∆ )(  (3) 
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where 
sA
A∆  is defined as the probability of a target being present in ∆A. Furthermore, 
)(AP
FTA
 is the probability of no false target attacks occurring before the munition has 
arrived at its present location. By assuming a non-zero false target report rate, PFTR, the 
probability of no false target attacks in the searched area leading up to ∆A can be 
expressed as 
 A
FTA
eAP α−=)(  (4) 
This states the probability of not employing the weapon while searching an area A in a 
Poisson field of false targets.  
2.3 Persistent Area Denial Evaluation Scenarios 
This research focused on developing six test scenarios [12] to characterize several 
distributions of real and false targets over the battlespace, As. Scenarios 1 and 2 depict a 
Poisson distribution of false targets, while varying the real target distribution with 
Uniform or Poisson fields, respectively. Scenarios 3 and 4 model false targets with 
Poisson or Uniform fields, respectively, and real targets with a Uniform field. Finally, 
scenarios 5 and 6 model false targets with Poisson or Normal fields, respectively, while 
real targets are modeled via a Normal field. 
2.3.1 . Scenario 1 ( Single Uniform T, Poisson FTs) 
Scenario 1 presents a single target (T) uniformly distributed amongst a Poisson 
field of false targets (FTs) in a battlespace of area . For the Poisson field of FTs 
assuming a non-zero P
SA
FTR, α is modified as follows:  
 ( )αα FTRP−= 1:  (5) 
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Let f(t) be the probability density function (p.d.f) of the random variable t representing an 
attack on a real target. The probability of real target attack is formulated by  
 )()( AP
A
WVPtf
FTA
s
TR
⋅
=  (6) 
Noting equation (4),  f(t) is expressed as  
 AP
s
TR
FTRe
A
WVPtf α)1()( −−⋅=  (7) 
Also, As = VWT, and A=VWt, so  
 
T
tAA s=  (8) 
and 
 
TA
WV
s
1
=
⋅  (9) 
Now, by defining the Poisson parameter , λ = αAs, equation (8) can be reformed as 
 
T
tA λα =  (10) 
Using the above, equation (6) can now be expressed as 
 T
t
P
TR
FTReP
T
tf
λ)1(1)(
−−
=  (11) 
To determine the expectation of target attack the above can be integrated for the entire 
battle sweep, T, as represented below. 
  (12) ∫=
T
AT dttfP
0
)(
which results in 
 ( )
λ
λ
)1(
1)(
)1(
FTR
P
TRSA P
ePAP
FTR
T −
−
=
−−
 (13) 
Additionally, the probability of false target attack, , is defined using the p.d.f for 
false target attacks 
FTA
P
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which simplifies to  
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t
P
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T
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T
tg
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−−=  (15) 
By integration the expectation of a false target attack can be represented as 
  (16) ∫=
T
A dttgP FT
0
)(
and is  
 ( ) λλ
λ
)1()1(1
)1(
1)( FTRFTR
FT
P
TR
P
FTR
TR
SA ePeP
P
AP −−−− +−





−
−=  (17) 
To calculate the lifetime of a target, assuming an attack has occurred, let s be the time of 
either a real or false target attack. To calculate the probability of either a real or false 
target attack not occurring before time s the p.d.f , h(s), of the random variable s  
  )()( sH
ds
dsh −=  (18) 
is formed where H(s), the probability of either a a T or FT attack not happening before 
time s is defined as 
 


 −+−=
−−
T
sP
T
sesH TRT
sPFTR )1(1)(
)1( λ
  
 )1(
)1(
T
sPe TRT
s
PFTR
−=
−− λ
 (19) 
This allows the formulation of an expression, s , for the longevity of the munition in the 
case where the munition engages a target and subsequently is destroyed. 
 ∫ −=
T
sP
dsshss
0 )1(
)(  (20) 
where Ps = H(T). Through integration by parts the above is now 
2-8 
 
 
)1(
)(
0
s
T
s
P
PTdssH
s
−
−
=
∫
  (21) 
and is then 
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2.3.2 Scenario 2 ( Poisson T, Poisson FT ) 
For the second scenario considered a search environment consisting of both a 
Poisson field of targets, Ts, and false targets, FTs, is considered. For the Poisson field of 
real targets, the Poisson probability law parameter describing real targets, Tλ , is defined 
as 
 ST Aβλ =  (23) 
Here, the Poisson field target declarations of real targets is parameterized by 



2
1
km
β and 
false targets by 



2
1
km
α . The parameter β is defined as 
 TRT Pηβ =  (24) 
where ηT is defined as the real target object probability density.  So, recognizing the 
following p.d.fs , f(t) and g(t), of the random variable t for real and false target attack are 
 
[ ]
T
t
PP
TTR
TTRFTFTReP
T
tf
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λ
+−−
=
)1(1)(  (25) 
 
[ ]
T
t
PP
FTFTR
TTRFTFTReP
T
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λ
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−=
)1(
)1(1)(  (26) 
By integration as demonstrated in scenario 1 the respective probabilities of a T 
and FT attack are 
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Furthermore, by recognizing the probability of either a real or false target attack not 
occurring before time s as  
 T
sPP TTRFTFTResH
])1[(
)(
λλ +−−
=  (29) 
the expression for the lifetime of a target is then 
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2.3.3 Scenario 3 ( N Uniform Ts, Poisson FT ) 
Scenario 3 presents a search environment represented by a Poisson field of FTs, 
with a uniform distribution of N real targets, Ts. As in scenario 1 and 2, the Poisson field 
of FTs is parameterized by 



2
1
km
α .  A recursive form is used to present cases where 
. Therefore, for N real targets the probability of real target attack, , is defined 
as 
2≥N
TA
P
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Also, for false targets the probability of false target attack, , 
FTA
P
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1scenarioingiven
;11
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FT
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FTFTR
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N
A
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TR
N
A
P
PePP −−− −−−= λ  (32) 
To calculate the longevity of the munition, 
T
s , given the munition has attacked a target or 
false target, use the probability density function, hN(t), and the probability that an attack 
occurred  
2-10 
 
  (33) FTFTRPN eTH λ)1(1)(1 −−−=−
where 
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TR
N FTFTRe
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−−
−=  (34) 
2.3.4 Scenario 4 ( N Uniform Ts, M Uniform FTs ) 
In scenario 4, a uniform distribution environment is used to ensure real and false 
target encounters. The search environment consists of N uniformly distributed targets and 
M uniformly distributed false targets. Scenario 4 is unique in that the analytical solution 
for the probability of false target attack, , and the probability of real target attack, 
, is represented by a system of partial differential equations with given boundary 
conditions. This system is represented by  
FTA
P
TA
P
 ( ) ],[|],[ 11 NMAMEFTANTRNMA FTT PPPP −−−=  (35) 
 
Also, for false targets the probability of false target attack, , 
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With boundary conditions  
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And finally, for scenario 4, the longevity of the WASM, assuming a performed attack on 
target, is calculated by the following probability distribution function, . [ ] )(, τNMg
 T
T
P
T
P
T
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
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and the probability  
  (40) MFTR
N
TR
NM PPTH )1(1)(1 ),( −−=−
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2.3.5 Scenario 5 ( N Normal Ts, Poisson FTs) 
In scenario 5, a circular battlespace of radius  r centered at the origin is considered. 
The search area contains N Normally distributed targets with variance σ and M Poisson 
distributed false targets parameterized by 



2
1
km
α . Scenario 5 and later 6 are different 
from the previous 4 scenarios in that they search in a spiral pattern from the outside of the 
circle inward. [12] presents the probability of attack and flase target attack for this case as 
  (41) ∫ −−−+− +−=
22
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Similarly, the probability of an attack occurring is characterized as 
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2.3.6 Scenario 6 ( N Normal Ts, M Circular FTs ) 
Scenario 6 consists of a similar battlespace configuration as scenario 5, with the 
exception that false targets are distributed according to a Normal distribution with 
variance σFT.  As with scenario 5, the munition search path starts from the outer rim of the 
circular battlespace and searches inward. The p.d.f.s of interest are 
2-12 
 
 M
FTRFTR
N
TRTR
T
TR
NM
FT
TFT
ePP
ePPeNPf








−+
⋅







+−=
−
−
−−
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
22
2
),(
)1(
11)(
σ
ρ
σ
ρ
σ
ρ
ρ
σ
ρ
 (45) 
 1
2
22
2
),(
2
2
2
2
2
2
)1(
11)1()(
−
−
−−








−+
⋅







+−−=
M
FTRFTR
N
TRTR
FT
FTR
NM
FT
TFT
ePP
ePPeMPg
σ
ρ
σ
ρ
σ
ρ
ρ
σ
ρ
 (46) 
and 
 
M
FTRFTR
N
TRTR
NM FTT ePPePPH








−+







+−=
−− 2
2
2
2
22),( )1(1)( σ
ρ
σ
ρ
ρ  (47) 
 
2-13 
 
III. MultiUAV Simulation Environment 
Wide area search scenarios presented in chapter II were employed in this research 
for the express purpose of validating the operation of MultiUAV Version 1.3, an existing 
USAF Wide Area Search Munitions simulation. MultiUAV is a Simulink[19] based 
simulation environment developed by the Control Sciences Division, Air Vehicles 
Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL/VACA). This simulation is currently 
used in ongoing research in industry, government, and academia to develop, modify, and 
improve the performance of decentralized cooperative control algorithms This section 
discusses the simulation obtained from AFRL/VACA and changes that were made to 
facilitate this research. 
3.1 Original Simulation 
3.1.1 Simulation Operation The simulation operates on the general 
characteristics of wide area search munitions. Therefore, searching WASMs perform 
actions based on rules that control the event flow of the mission, as seen in Figure 3-1 
MultiUAV State Engine.  
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Figure 3-1 MultiUAV State Engine 
The orders of operation for the rules that govern the chain of events, or ‘Kill Chain’, 
are as follows; 
• Detected 
• Classified 
• Attacked 
• Killed 
• Verified Destroyed 
The MultiUAV environment performs all operations based on the flow of these events.  
A typical simulation begins with the vehicles starting from pre-determined positions 
and flying prescribed search patterns.  When an object enters a vehicle’s field of regard, 
the vehicle classifies the object as a target or non-target and assigns a probability of 
correct classification based on the angle from which the vehicle viewed the object. 
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Several looks at a target are required to exceed the probability of target identification 
confidence, Pc. Upon meeting the required looks to meet or exceed the value of Pc a target 
type declaration is made. This information is passed to each vehicle, which then calculate 
the benefits of performing certain tasks.  Possible tasks are:  
• Continue searching, 
• Re-classify a previously classified target 
• Perform target attack 
• Perform battle damage assessment on an attacked target   
Vehicle tasks are assigned such that the overall benefit is maximized. This task allocation 
occurs each time the state of a target changes until the maximum simulation time is 
reached. 
While the MultiUAV environment relies on several functions to perform the 
entire kill chain, Target Classification and Task Assignment have the greatest effect on 
the results of the simulation and thus will be explained in further detail. 
3.2 Simulation Functions 
 
This section will cover the core functions of MultiUAV, know as the Embedded 
Flight Software (9).  Highlighted are the modifications necessary to the simulation during 
this research effort. 
3.2.1 Task Assignment 
The capacitated transshipment problem, as outlined in [14], provides the method for 
task allocation generation for the WASMs modeled in the MultiUAV environment. A 
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graphical representation of the network is shown in Figure 3-2 Capacitated 
Transshipment Network.  
 
Figure 3-2 Capacitated Transshipment Network 
 The capacitated transshipment network is a modified linear programming problem 
that results in an integer solution. Capacitated transshipment is based on optimal routing 
of resources to meet demand in a network of defined capacity. At the sink of the network 
is a demand of N, where N is the number of WASMs.  The targets are transshipment 
nodes with supplies and demands of zero. N WASMs must travel through the network to 
satisfy the end demand. The vehicles travel through the network along arcs that represent 
specific tasks and have certain value, or benefits, associated with them. The flow through 
the network is determined by the benefits associated with the various arcs.  The values of 
these benefits are crucial to solving the network flow problem. By analyzing all arcs, the 
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optimal task allocation provides the greatest overall benefit to the system.  MultiUAV 
employs a probabilistic approach [13] for task assignment, wherein emphasis is placed on 
killing high value targets over performing other tasks such as reclassification or battle 
damage assessment. 
This research focused on a single WASM, and therefore the cooperative aspects 
of task allocation were not considered. Due to this consideration, very few modifications 
were made to the task allocation methods and therefore do not warrant discussion here. 
3.2.2 Target Classification and Confidence.  When a WASM classifies an 
object, the ATR function calculates a confidence level for that classification based on the 
angle from which the vehicle viewed the object. If the confidence is below a user-defined 
threshold, a second look at the target will be assigned to assist in classifying the object if 
the user specifies cooperation. Upon the second look, the individual confidences are then 
combined into a single confidence level that is compared to the threshold value. Once the 
confidence of correct classification is greater than the threshold, the object is deemed 
classified. This process assumes perfect identification of a target [10], and therefore a 
process to introduce error was introduced in order to provide realistic modeling of the 
ATR function. The confusion matrix, as described in section 2.2.1. is used to model the 
error associated with target misidentification.   
The confusion matrix provides misidentification by allowing for a false target to 
be declared as real, and vice versa. This method implemented in the simulation is as 
follows:  
• Upon encounter of either a true or false target, a random sample between 0 and 1 
from a uniform distribution is performed 
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• The value of the random sample is compared to the diagonal and off diagonal 
terms of the corresponding column of confusion matrix. 
• The target type is declared based on the above comparison 
For example, assume a WASM has encountered a true target. If PTR for the WASM is 
95%, and the random sample from the uniform distribution is .85, the target would be 
declared as real. However, if the sample had exceeded .95, then according to the 
confusion matrix of Figure 3-3 Confusion Matrix of Ptr =.95, a false target would then be 
declared. The identical process occurs when a false target is encountered by a WASM. 
For a matter of convenience, PTR and PFTR were declared identical. This research looked 
at the results of two different ATR’s, one having a PTR of 95%, and one of 85%. Varying 
the capabilities of the two ATR’s provided insight into the effect of false target 
declaration on the overall number of real vs. false target attacks. As a note, the simulation 
used truth information to identify what target type the WASM is actually seeing, while 
the output from the confusion matrix provides perceived information.  
 Encountered Object 
 Target Non-Target 
Declared Object     
Target .95 1-PFTR 
Non-Target .05 PFTR 
Figure 3-3 Confusion Matrix of Ptr =.95 
3.2.3 Communications.  The simulation entails perfect global 
communication of perceived information. Currently MultiUAV provides error free, 
instantaneous dissemination of information to all vehicles operating in the simulation. It 
is important to note that a realistic depiction of communications would be range, 
bandwidth, and latency limited and information may be miscommunicated or not 
communicated at all.  In a multi WASM simulation employing cooperation, Mitchell [16]  
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has noted different vehicles would calculate benefits based on different information, and 
the network flow problem may become unstable. This research focused on a single 
WASM and did not take into account these considerations, so inter vehicle 
communications was not applicable. 
The communications architecture of MultiUAV was developed to separate truth 
information, or what the simulation knows to be true, from perceived information, or 
what the individual WASM would know based on it’s notion of the world around it. As a 
note, perceived information can vary from the truth as WASMs can misidentify targets 
via the confusion matrix. Dunkel [13] and Gozaydin [15] had made initial modifications 
to MultiUAV to allow WASMs to retrieve and store perceived information. This method 
was modified by creating a more efficient means of separating the perceived information 
from truth information by each vehicle in the simulation. This research did not focus on 
multiple WASMs cooperating, so the implications of perceived information were not as 
pronounced as they would be from multiple, cooperating vehicles relying on perceived 
information to make tasking decisions. This modification, however, did force a change in 
how the ATR confidence calculations were performed. Due to the possibility that 
multiple looks may be required on a single target, many different perceived type targets 
may be stored in memory by the WASM. To prevent this from occurring, the maximum 
confidence value was assigned to each target upon detection, thus preventing multiple 
looks at a single target. This however would have no effect on misidentification of a 
target. 
3.2.4 Lethality.  When a WASM attacks a target in MultiUAV, a simulated kill 
radius is considered that effects any target that lies within the area covered by the blast 
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radius. The MultiUAV simulation environment provides for the ability to model 
successful and unsuccessful attacks on a target, thus allowing more realistic kill scenarios 
to be considered. The kill event occurring within the warhead blast radius is modeled by 
comparing a random draw from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 to a user-defined 
probability of kill (Pk). For example, when a vehicle attacks a target, a random draw is 
made and compared to the value of Pk. If the random draw and Pk value are such that a 
successful hit occurs, then the target is considered killed.  
This research used two values of Pk ,50% and 80%, to represent a small and large 
warhead, respectively. Thus, every scenario was evaluated for a small and large warhead. 
The number of successful and unsuccessful attacks for each scenario was collected for 
post processing. 
3.2.5 Battle Damage Assessment.  In a multiple cooperative WASM 
scenario, the final task in the kill chain is battle damage assessment (BDA). After a target 
has been attacked, another vehicle may be assigned to assess the damage done to that 
target. Due to this research’s focus on a single WASM, the BDA state was never 
achieved, and thus no modifications were made to the BDA functionality of MulitUAV. 
3.3 Simulated Target Distributions 
The distribution of both real and false targets in the MultiUAV simulation is made 
possible by the use of three independent distribution methods; uniform, normal, and 
Poisson. The use of multiple distribution methods is necessary to model different target 
encounter scenarios. The following section describes the motivation and methodology 
employed with these three methods. 
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3.3.1 Battlespace Configuration 
The battlespace for scenarios 1-4 considers search strip 600 meter wide by 
270,000 meters in length. This provides a search area with equal width of the WASM’s 
primary target acquisition sensor, and with length that can be traversed by the WASM in 
a 30-minute time of flight. This search area was selected as it modeled as closely as 
possible the battlespace considered in scenarios 1-4.  
Scenarios 5 and 6 require special attention in the construction of their respective 
search areas. The analytic models depicted in chapter II are constructed based on a 
circular search area. The search area used in the simulation, however, was of identical 
configurations as those of scenarios 1-4, with the exception of the overall length of the 
search area. This was necessary due to modeling limitations in the simulation. As a note, 
the analytic models for scenarios 5,6 were modified to reflect the change from a circular 
to linear search area. 
3.3.2 Uniform Target Distribution 
A target distributed at random via sampling from a uniform distribution is the 
most direct method to place an expected number of targets over a battlespace of known 
area. This method is used when it is desired to distribute a fixed number of targets over a 
specified area. Such an example would be if battlefield intelligence has reported the 
known number of targets, Ntgt, within a specified battlespace but were unable to ascertain 
their locations. A random distribution of the known number of targets over the specified 
area is then performed within the simulation to match the expected battlefield conditions. 
The uniform distribution is implemented by using a random number generator 
based upon a uniform distribution of Ntgt .This requires the user to provide the known 
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number of target to be encountered. Since MultiUAV is Matlab based, the uniform 
random number generator is easily implemented by using the built in command 
RAND(Ntgt). The RAND(Ntgt) function generates an array of random numbers whose 
elements are uniformly distributed in the interval (0,1). Thus, RAND(Ntgt) returns an Ntgt-
by-1 matrix of random entries. The elements of the random vector are then multiplied by 
a scaling factor to convert them to a representative distance between 0 and the maximum 
length of the battlespace. The RAND function allows the user to seed the random number 
generator, and thus the simulation reseeds the random number generator as to prevent 
identical target distributions as the previous simulation run.  
3.3.3 Normal Target Distribution 
Distributing targets using a normal distribution allows for a concentration of 
targets about a specified mean, µloc, with standard deviation σloc. For example, assume an 
intelligence report just arrived that specified the location of a target 10 minutes ago. If the 
mean and standard deviation of the sensor used to collect the location of the target is 
known, then a target location can be created in the simulation by using a the same mean , 
µloc, and standard deviation σloc. This assumes stationary targets. Modeling target 
locations via Normal distributions has the added benefit of allowing the possibility of not 
encountering Ntgt. This is made possible by selecting σloc to generate an expected 
percentage of total Ntgt encountered over the total battlespace.  
The normal distribution is implemented in nearly the same way as the uniform 
distribution, with the addition of supplying the mean , µloc, and standard deviation σloc. In 
this case, the vehicle is assumed to begin searching at the location x=0, thus µloc = 0. 
Next, σloc was chosen such that 80.64% of all targets would fall within the battlespace. 
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This was identified simply by referring to a normal distribution area chart [17] to identify 
the Z score, where  
 
loc
locMaxXZ
σ
µ−
= , (48) 
and XMax is the length of the battlespace. Because it is assumed that µloc is 0, and the 
normal distribution area chart refers to 80.64% as Z=1.3, or 1.3 standard deviations above 
the mean. Thus, by substitution,  σloc is computed to be 98.46.  
The computed standard deviation and zero mean value are used in the 
RANDN(Ntgt) MATLAB command to produce a vector of Ntgt random normal target 
locations centered about the mean. As a note, it is possible to generate both positive and 
negative random values. Therefore, to simulate searching from the center of a distribution 
outward, all values are interpreted as the absolute value, and thus the WASM need only 
to fly in one direction to cover the entire target distribution. 
3.3.4 Poisson Target Distribution 
The Poisson distribution provides for target encounters to be modeled as an 
expected number of events, Ntgt , that will occur over a the specified battlespace. Thus, 
the expectation of many samples from a Poisson distribution will result in Ntgt, however 
each random sample may be above or below Ntgt. This allows for the modeling of non-
constant Ntgt values for each simulation run, but still maintain a mean value of Ntgt over 
the total number of simulation runs. 
The Poisson process was implemented in MultiUAV by using a Poisson distribution 
based random number generator  (18). The random number generator requires λ, the 
Poisson Probability Law Parameter, for the target type. Thus 
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 λ = αA (49) 
where A is the area of the battlespace and α is the target density 2
1
Km
. For example, if an 
average of Ntgt targets are distributed at random over a region As, and a vehicle can 
search at a rate of Q
hr
Km , then the number of vehicles sighted by the WASM over a time 
T obeys the Poisson Probability law with parameter defined a 
 QT
A
N
s
tgt






=λ  (50) 
where in this case  
 Q=WV, QT=As (51) 
and W is 600 meters and V is 142.4
s
m . Thus Q= 85,440
s
m2  
Now, if Ntgt is 10 false targets, and the WASM can search for 1800s , or 30 min, then 
λ = 10.  
MultiUAV requires the exact location of a target so that it knows exactly where it 
lies within the simulated battlespace. As a note, Equation 50 describes the Poisson 
parameter λ for the entire As Thus when using the Poisson distribution for random target 
locations As must be divided into many segments as to sample if there is a target present 
at that location. This affects Equation 50 by modifying As a smaller sample area, ∆A.  ∆A 
was selected to be 14.24 meters long by 600 meters wide. Therefore, the battlespace was 
divided in 18000 segments, as the total length of the battlefield is 256,320 m and the 
individual segment length is 14.24 m.  
3.4 Additional Modifications.  In order to facilitate this research, several other 
modifications were made to the original simulation.  These modifications allow summary 
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and output to a file of specified statistics and allow the activation or de-activation of 
various features such as distribution types.  While these changes were important for this 
research effort, they did not affect how the actual simulation ran and are not described in 
detail here. 
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IV. Results and Analysis 
4.1 Simulation Considerations 
In order to validate the MultiUAV simulation, the analytical results of the six 
scenarios developed in Section II were compared to empirical results from Monte Carlo 
simulations. Each scenario was configured in the simulation to match the false and true 
target density, the distribution type,. Additionally, the WASM lethality and the ability of 
the ATR algorithm to correctly classify the target type were set to match those values 
used in the scenario analytical formulation. These parameters can be sorted into two 
categories. 
• WASM Parameters: 
o ATR capabilities modeled in the confusion matrix (Figure 2-2) as 
PTR and PFTR. 
o Warhead lethality, Pk 
• Battlespace Characteristics 
o Uniform number of Targets, N 
o Uniform number of False Targets, M 
o Real Target Poisson Probability Law Parameter, Tλ  
o False Target Poisson Probability Law Parameter, FTλ  
o Standard Deviation of Target location, σloc 
o Standard Deviation of False Target location, σlocFT 
. 
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Park [11] has noted these values can be interpreted as both environmental factors relating 
to the conditions of the battlespace and design parameters of the WASM. These 
parameters would normally be emphasized in grater detail, as in the case of performing a 
trade study. However, the focus of this effort is to merely validate the performance of the 
MultiUAV environment, and thus arbitrary values for the above parameters were selected 
to make the analysis simple.  
The output data derived from the simulations are provided in the form of 
quantitative values for each battlefield scenario. Thus, the analysis of output data focuses 
on the numbers of targets and false targets attacked and killed while the values describing 
the battlespace and WASM parameters are varied. 
4.2 Validity Investigation Methodology 
Scenarios 1-6, as outlined in chapter II were each implemented by varying the 
WASM Parameters and Battlespace Characteristics to create a range of realistic mission 
conditions. Table 4-1 Simulation Parameter Variations outlines the test values used to 
vary these parameters for scenarios 1-6.  
Parameter Value 
PTR, PFTR .85, .95 
Pk .5, .8 
Table 4-1 Simulation Parameter Variations 
As noted in chapter II, PTR, and PFTA|E are assumed identical for all scenarios. This table 
does not include the variations to the distributions of the targets, as this pertains to the 
individual scenarios. Each scenario evaluation was performed by following an identical 
test matrix, as outlined in Table 4-2 Test Matrix.  
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Test Case PTR, PFTR Pk 
1 .85 .5 
2 .85 .8 
3 .95 .5 
4 .95 .8 
Table 4-2 Test Matrix 
The configuration of the test matrix provided identical WASM parameters during 
the Monte Carlo runs for each scenario. For the purpose of validity investigation, the 
results of the simulation were compared to the calculated values of mission success 
predictions outlined in chapter II.  
4.3 Validity Investigation 
The results derived from the simulation focused on five primary metrics outlined 
in section 2.1.3. They are 
• Probability of real target attack,  
TA
P
• Probability of false target attack,  
FTA
P
• Probability of successful target kill, PTk 
• Probability of successful false target kill, PFTk 
• Longevity of WASM given attack occurs, 
sT
s , where s is time of attack 
Where PTk and PFTk are calculated by  
 kATTk PPP ⋅=  (52) 
4-3 
 
These five metrics represent the expectations that both real and false targets are attacked, 
destroyed, and on average how long the WASM searched the battlespace before engaging 
either a T or FT.  
The following six sections represent the comparative results of the simulation vs. 
analytical formulations. The results are presented in tabular form, with the analytical 
solution to the expected probabilities in the Analytical Calculation column, and the mean 
of the total simulation results in the Simulation Result column. Each Monte Carlo 
simulation of a scenario was run 400 times, 100 per variation of PTR and Pk. This number 
of runs was performed to yield high statistical confidence for the given model. 
4.3.1 Scenario I Results 
The simulation model for the validity investigation of scenario 1 was set up using 
a single uniformly distributed T, and Poisson distribution of FTs. Hence, λFT = 10, for the 
expectation of 10 false targets over the battlespace, and T =1. The results are tabulated 
below. 
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Ptr Pk Metric Simulation Value Analytical Value PercentDiff
0.85 0.50 PAT 46.0 44.0 2.0
    PAFT 48.0 45.1 2.9
    PTk 22.0 22.0 0.0
    PFTk 24.0 24.0 0.0
    s/T 0.3 0.3 1.0
  0.80 PAT 46.0 44.0 2.0
    PAFT 48.0 52.6 4.6
    PTk 37.0 35.2 1.8
    PFTk 41.0 42.1 1.1
    s/T 0.3 0.3 1.0
0.95 0.50 PAT 74.0 74.8 0.8
    PAFT 20.0 22.2 2.2
    PTk 37.0 37.4 0.4
    PFTk 11.0 11.1 0.1
    s/T 0.4 0.4 1.8
  0.80 PAT 74.0 74.8 0.8
    PAFT 20.0 22.2 2.2
    PTk 61.0 59.8 1.2
    PFTk 19.0 17.7 1.3
    s/T 0.4 0.4 1.8
Table 4-3 Scenario 1 Results 
4.3.2 Scenario 2 Results 
The simulation model for the validity investigation of scenario 2 was set up using 
a Poisson distribution of Ts, and Poisson distribution of FTs. Hence, λFT = 10, for the 
expectation of 10 false targets over the battlespace, and λT =1. This setup resembles that 
of Scenario 1, with the exception that the targets are all modeled via Poisson 
distributions. The results are tabulated below. 
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Ptr Pk Metric Simulation Value Analytical Value Difference 
0.85 0.50 PAT 31.0 32.7 1.7
    PAFT 59.0 57.7 1.3
    PTk 15.0 16.4 1.4
    PFTk 30.0 28.9 1.1
    s/T 29.4 32.0 2.6
  0.80 PAT 31.0 32.7 1.7
    PAFT 59.0 57.7 1.3
    PTk 24.0 26.2 2.2
    PFTk 48.0 46.2 1.8
    s/T 29.4 32.0 2.6
0.95 0.50 PAT 50.0 50.1 0.1
    PAFT 27.0 26.4 0.6
    PTk 25.0 25.1 0.1
    PFTk 12.0 13.2 1.2
    s/T 33.2 38.3 5.1
  0.80 PAT 50.0 50.1 0.1
    PAFT 27.0 26.4 0.6
    PTk 37.0 40.1 3.1
    PFTk 22.0 21.1 0.9
    s/T 33.2 38.3 5.1
Table 4-4 Scenario 2 Results 
4.3.3 Scenario 3 Results 
The simulation model for the validity investigation of scenario 3 was set up using 
N uniformly distributed Ts, and Poisson distribution of FTs. Hence, λFT = 10, for the 
expectation of 10 false targets over the battlespace, and N = 5 for Ts. The results are 
tabulated below. 
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Ptr Pk Metric Simulation Value Analytical Value Difference 
0.85 0.50 PAT 77.0 77.0 0.0
    PAFT 22.0 26.5 4.5
    PTk 39.0 38.5 0.5
    PFTk 8.0 13.3 5.3
    s/T 16.1 15.6 0.5
  0.80 PAT 77.0 77.0 0.0
    PAFT 22.0 26.5 4.5
    PTk 64.0 61.6 2.4
    PFTk 20.0 21.2 1.2
    s/T 16.1 15.6 0.5
0.95 0.50 PAT 92.0 91.2 0.8
    PAFT 8.0 11.2 3.2
    PTk 46.0 45.6 0.4
    PFTk 3.0 5.6 2.6
    s/T 17.2 16.3 0.9
  0.80 PAT 92.0 91.2 0.8
    PAFT 8.0 11.2 3.2
    PTk 77.0 73.0 4.0
    PFTk 8.0 8.9 0.9
    s/T 17.2 16.3 0.9
Table 4-5 Scenario 3 Results 
4.3.4 Scenario 4 Results 
The simulation model for the validity investigation of scenario 4 was set up using 
a N uniformly distributed T, and M uniformly distributed FTs. Hence, Μ = 10, for the 
expectation of 10 false targets over the battlespace, and N=1 for Ts. The results are 
tabulated below. 
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Ptr Pk Metric Simulation Value Analytical Value Difference 
0.85 0.50 PAT 41.0 42.9 1.9
    PAFT 57.0 54.1 2.9
    PTk 22.0 21.5 0.6
    PFTk 35.0 27.1 8.0
    s/T 35.6 34.5 1.1
  0.80 PAT 41.0 42.9 1.9
    PAFT 57.0 54.1 2.9
    PTk 35.0 34.3 0.7
    PFTk 49.0 43.3 5.7
    s/T 35.6 34.5 1.1
0.95 0.50 PAT 72.0 74.5 2.5
    PAFT 24.0 22.5 1.5
    PTk 37.0 37.3 0.3
    PFTk 18.0 11.3 6.8
    s/T 45.4 44.3 1.0
  0.80 PAT 72.0 74.5 2.5
    PAFT 24.0 22.5 1.5
    PTk 59.0 59.6 0.6
    PFTk 23.0 18.0 5.0
    s/T 45.4 44.3 1.0
Table 4-6 Scenario 4 Results 
4.3.5 Scenario 5 Results 
The simulation model for the validity investigation of scenario 5 was set up using 
a N=1 Normally distributed T having σΤ of 98.46 and Poisson distributed FTs. This was 
realized using λFT = 10, for the expectation of 10 false targets over the battlespace, and N 
= 1 for Ts. The results are tabulated below. 
 
Ptr Pk Metric Simulation Value Analytical Value Difference 
0.85 0.5 PAT 43.0 40.0 3.0
    PAFT 32.0 32.0 0.0
    PTk 21.0 20.4 0.6
    PFTk 16.0 15.8 0.2
    s/T 27.1 24.2 2.9
  0.8 PAT 43.0  40.0 0.5
    PAFT 39.0 32.0 7.0
    PTk 36.0 34.3 1.7
    PFTk 26.0 25.4 0.6
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    s/T 29.3  24.2 5.1
0.95 0.5 PAT 67.0  64.4 2.6
    PAFT 10.0 10.5 0.5
    PTk 31.0 32.2 1.2
    PFTk 6.0 5.2 1.2
    s/T 35.6 33.0 2.6
  0.8 PAT 67.0  64.4 2.6
    PAFT 15.0 10.5 4.5
    PTk 55.0 51.5 3.5
    PFTk 9.0 8.4 0.6
    s/T 35.3 33.0 2.3
Table 4-7 Scenario 5 Results 
4.3.6 Scenario 6 Results 
The simulation model for the validity investigation of scenario 6 was set up using 
a N Normally distributed T having σΤ of 98.46 and M Normally distributed FT having σΤ 
of 98.46. This was realized using M = 10, for the expectation of 10 false targets over the 
battlespace, and N = 1 for Ts. The results are tabulated below. 
Ptr Pk Metric Simulation Value Analytical Value Difference 
0.85 0.5 PAT 37.0 30.2 6.8
    PAFT 54.0 43.0 11.0
    PTk 18.0 15.0 3.0
    PFTk 30.0 21.1 8.9
    s/T 26.1 25.0 0.1
  0.8 PAT 32.0  30.2 1.8
    PAFT 52.0 43.0 9.0
    PTk 29.0 24.0 5.0
    PFTk 44.0 34.4 9.6
    s/T 24.5 25.0 0.5
0.95 0.5 PAT 70.0  71.6 1.6
    PAFT 20.0 16.1 3.9
    PTk 36.0 35.8 0.2
    PFTk 11.0 8.0 3.0
    s/T 38.3 29.0 9.3
  0.8 PAT 69.0  71.6 2.6
    PAFT 16.0 16.1 0.1
    PTk 56.0 57.2 1.2
    PFTk 14.0 12.8 1.2
    s/T 32.1 29.0 3.1
Table 4-8 Scenario 6 Results 
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4.4 Validation Results 
Tables 4-3 through 4-8 present the comparative results of scenarios 1 through 6. 
In review one can see the analytical predictions for all scenarios closely align with the 
simulation results. This is evident as the percent differences between the analytical and 
empirical data fall well within a 9.6% error bound defined by the confidence interval 
based on 100 samples per simulation run [22]. This is true for all cases except scenario 6 
where PFTA and  PFTk for PTR= .85 exceed the error bound by 2%. This is the result of data 
generated from several machines that have dissimilar random number generators.  
The results indicate strong correlation between the analytical models for all 
scenarios, as the errors in all cases have fallen within the statistical confidence interval 
calculated for 100 simulation runs per scenario configuration. 
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
An evaluation methodology to provide a baseline performance validation of the 
MultiUAV simulation tool has been proposed. This evaluation compares the simulation 
vs. analytical results for scenarios comprised of both real and false target attacks, in 
addition to the lifetime of a single WASM over a range of vehicle performance 
parameters. Six analytical scenarios provide the necessary variations in the type of multi-
target distributions in order to evaluate the simulation performance parameters for 
varying battlespace conditions.  
Comparative results presented in the previous section indicate the use of the 
MultiUAV simulation can provide valid target classification and kill information. The 
validation methodology presented here is crucial for further research involving 
MultiUAV for use in the study of cooperative WASMs. This allows future decentralized 
cooperative control research to focus on control algorithms, as the results of each target 
attack and kill are now deemed valid. 
The following sections will discuss the limitations of the current research and 
propose future research topics to address these concerns. 
5.1 Limitations of the Validation Model 
In order to reproduce an environment described by the six analytic scenarios 
several simplifications in the simulation were necessary. First, a generic WASM was 
used in all cases to provide results representing broad applicability to future research 
applications. This was done by not allowing the WASM to perform any non-conventional 
search or attack capabilities that would limit the results to only certain vehicle types 
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possessing a similar capability. Lost search time due to a blind turn and/or redundancy 
was not covered. Second, the analytic solutions do not associate target classifications 
with the aspect angle in which it was seen by the WASM.  Therefore, while MultiUAV is 
capable of performing this action it was disabled for this research. Finally, the analytical 
solutions were formulated based on static targets. Therefore the simulation was 
configured to present stationary targets  
5.2 Recommended Further Research 
The validation methods presented here are valid for a single searching munition 
capable of attacking a single target in a static environment of real and false targets. There 
is a need, however, to expand this research to provide for the evaluation of more complex 
SEAD type scenarios employing cooperative WASMs or multi warhead capable UAVs. 
Multiple warhead capability analysis has already been performed for scenarios 1,2, 
however work to resolve the multi-warhead cases for the remaining scenarios is ongoing 
at this time. 
 Future work to expand the analytical methods presented in this research should 
incorporate mission success probabilities for multiple, cooperative WASMs. This, as 
mentioned earlier, will provide a method to validate the empirical results generated by a 
simulation using cooperative control algorithms. This includes formulating basic rules of 
engagement based on cooperative attack and/or target classification. Additionally, efforts 
should be made to incorporate various types of Ts, and allow for variations in FTs. This 
would allow for more than a simple binary confusion matrix, as was employed in this 
research. Finally, the statistical models should incorporate a the probability of a munition 
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correctly identifying an object dependant on view angle in which it encounters the target. 
This will allow for more realistic target classifications. 
Modifications are necessary to the MultiUAV simulation for future research in 
cooperative control of WASMs. The area of greatest improvement is to incorporate more 
realistic communications inter vehicle communications system. Currently the simulation 
environment assumes perfect communications between vehicles. While this is convenient 
for baseline comparisons a flawed communications system incorporating delays, 
latencies, and signal loss would present a more realistic scenario for cooperative control 
scenarios. 
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Appendix A:  Scenario 1 Data 
 Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
Poisson FT, 1 Uniform T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.5
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results 
Poisson FT, 1 Uniform T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.8
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
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Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results 
Poisson FT, 1 Uniform T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.5
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
Poisson FT, 1 Uniform T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.8
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
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Appendix B:  Scenario 2 Data 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results 
Poisson FT, Poisson T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.5
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results 
Poisson FT, Poisson T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.8
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
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Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results  Poisson FT, 
Poisson T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.5
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results  Poisson FT, 
Poisson T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.8
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
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Appendix C: Scenario 3 Data 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
Poisson FT, 5 Uniform T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.5
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
Poisson FT, 5 Uniform T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.8
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
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Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
Poisson FT, 5 Uniform T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.5
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
Poisson FT, 5 Uniform T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.8
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
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Appendix D: Scenario 4 Data 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
10 Uniform FTs, 1 Uniform T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.5
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
10 Uniform FTs, 1 Uniform T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.8
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
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Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
10 Uniform FTs, 1 Uniform T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.5
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
10 Uniform FTs, 1 Uniform T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.8
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
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Appendix E: Scenario 5 Data 
 
 
 Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
Normal FT, Normal T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.5
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
Normal FT, Normal T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.8
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E-1 
 
E-2 
 
 Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results Normal FT, Normal 
T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
Normal FT, Normal T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.8
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
Appendix F: Scenario 6 Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results
Poisson FT, Normal T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results Poisson 
FT, Normal T, Ptr=.85, Pk=.8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
F-1 
 
F-2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results 
Poisson FT, Normal T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
 
Percent Error for Simulation Vs. Analytical Results 
Poisson FT, Normal T, Ptr=.95, Pk=.8
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
PAT PAFT PTk PFTk s/T
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